A key challenge in Web services security is the design of effective access control schemes that can adequately meet the unique security challenges posed by the Web services paradigm. Despite the recent advances in Web based access control approaches applicable to Web services, there remain issues that impede the development of effective access control models for Web services environment. Amongst them are the lack of context-aware models for access control, and reliance on identity or capability-based access control schemes. Additionally, the unique service access control features required in Web services technology are not captured in existing schemes. In this paper, we motivate the design of an access control scheme that addresses these issues, and propose an extended, trust-enhanced version of our XML-based Role Based Access Control (X-RBAC) framework that incorporates trust and context into access control. We outline the configuration mechanism needed to apply our model to the Web services environment, and provide a service access control specification. The paper presents an example service access policy composed using our framework, and also describes the implementation architecture for the system.
Introduction
Security in Web services is critical to their wide-scale adoption and integration in Webbased enterprise systems and softwares. The present day Web is abound with examples of Web-based enterprise services, and there is an increasing trend amongst them to migrate to the Web services platform in order to enhance and diversify the online services provided to their customers. While shifting from the traditional client-server architecture to Web services technology is seen as an endorsement of the Internet community's faith in the promise of the Web services paradigm, the goals of interoperability and ubiquity as envisioned by the Web services technology can only reasonably be realized if the unique security challenges posed by this paradigm are appropriately addressed. Among these challenges is to develop models for effective access control in dynamic XML-based Web services. The uniqueness here comes from the fact that the Web-based enterprise resources being exposed via Web services are typically dynamic and distributed in nature, and hence require adaptive access control models that can capture the dynamically changing security requirements of the target enterprise.
The mechanisms required to effectively enforce access control across distributed, heterogeneous domains are becoming increasingly complex. This complexity arises not only because of the sheer size of the distributed clientele accessing online services but also because of the fact that access control system should capture security-relevant contextual information, such as time, location, or environmental state available at the time the access requests are made, and incorporate it in its access control decisions. These context parameters capture the dynamically changing access requirements in a Web-based enterprise, and hence are critical to the effectiveness of the resulting access control scheme. The context directly affects the level of trust associated with a user, and hence the authorizations granted to him/her. These parameters constitute what is generally termed as a "user profile". The access privileges of requestors to an online service provider could be based on certain thresholds as established by the System Security Officer (SSO) based on the requestor's access patterns. A SSO is responsible for maintaining and administering the system security policy.
If at any time, a requestor appears to deviate from his/her usual profile, the thresholds (i.e. the trust level) would automatically be reduced as a precaution to prevent a potential abuse of privileges. This is a real-time requirement, and is exceedingly important in dynamic Web services serving thousands of customers with diverse activity profiles. In order for the access control to be effectively exercised in such scenarios with context-sensitive access requirements, the traditional access control models must be extended to make them contextaware. To this end, we propose to employ the generalized temporal extension to our X-RBAC [4] model, the XML-based Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (X-GTRBAC) model [3] . X-GTRBAC was originally proposed as a solution to enterprise-wide access control, but due to its XML-based framework, it can also be configured to provide access control in Web services. In Section 3, we introduce the reader to the X-GTRBAC model and outline the mechanism to extend X-GTRBAC as a context-aware access control framework for Web services environment.
Another issue we highlight in the paper is the use of trust in access control. There are different (although related) notions of "trust" in the literature. The one that is relevant to our purposes is the level of confidence associated with a user based on certain certified attributes thereof. In our framework, this level of confidence is used to initially authenticate the user and is dynamically adjusted thereafter and incorporated into subsequent access control decisions. The initial trust level of the user is not quantitatively reported. Instead, we rely on the Trust Management (TM) approach of trusted third parties (such as any PKI CA 1 ), and use the certification provided by them to authenticate the users. We derive our motivation for doing so from the review of existing Web-based access control schemes that have adopted either an identity or capability-based approach to authenticate/authorize users [2, 4, 7, 10, 18, 20] . Such mechanisms do not scale well to the distributed Web services architecture because the identities and capabilities of all users in a distributed environment cannot be known in advance. Such approaches would thereby cause a significant burden to be attached to the enforcement of the access control scheme. In order to overcome this limitation, we outline a mechanism to incorporate "trust domains" in access control decisions. There are two phases of our trust model; the initial trust establishment using TM credentials (i.e. certificates), and dynamic trust adjustment based on the user's "access context". The trust model shall be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by providing a compendium of related work in the area of Web services security, and discuss how our framework aligns with the existing security architectures. We also review the features provided by existing Web-based access control schemes, and their suitability to Web services. We next introduce our trust-based context-aware access control model, which is based on a temporal extension of X-RBAC with trust domains incorporated into it. The paper concludes with the discussion of implementation architecture of our model and an overview of future research goals.
Background and related work
We shall now provide a background and compendium of current state of the art in Web services security. A fair amount of related research in this area is due to the industry, with standards such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [15] and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [19] having been recently adopted. SAML defines an XML framework for exchanging authentication and authorization information for securing Web services, and relies on third-party authorities for provision of "assertions" containing such information. XACML is an XML framework for specifying access control policies for Web-based resources, and with significant extensions that can potentially be applied to secure Web services.
The XACML specification supports identity-based access control and incorporates some contextual information, such as location and time, into access decisions, without however any formal context-aware access control model. Additionally, XACML is not designed as a role-based language, and hence it lacks the salient features of role based access control (RBAC) for scalable administration [16] and suitability to dynamic Web-based access control [4] . There exists an XACML profile for RBAC; however it is not session-based since there is no notion of sessions in XACML. Sessions are particularly important in dynamic Web services environment where simultaneous interactions typically occur between multiple entities, and the security state need to be maintained across all open sessions. Since XACML does not support sessions, the necessary features of RBAC such as dynamic separation of duty and role hierarchy constraints cannot be enforced. Hence, the RBAC profile for XACML can model requirements for role-based access control in a static environment, but may not be suited to dynamic Web services environment.
The most notable set of emerging specifications are the ones outlined in WS security roadmap [17] . The roadmap consists of a number of component specifications, the core amongst them are WS-Security, WS-Policy, and WS-Trust. WS-Security is a specification for securing whole or parts of an XML message using XML encryption and digital signature technology, and attaching security credentials thereto. WS-Policy is used to describe the security policies in terms of their characteristics and supported features (such as required "security tokens", encryption algorithms, privacy rules, etc.). In fact, WS-Policy is a metalanguage which can be used to create various policy languages for different purposes, and one could use it to define an access control policy. WS-Trust defines a trust model that allows for exchange of such security tokens (using mechanisms provided by WS-Security, and according to the requirements supplied by WS-Policy) in order to enable the issuance and dissemination of credentials within different trust domains, and establish online trust relationships.
The models proposed in the roadmap have been directed primarily at the authentication aspect of Web services security, with an emphasis on designing secure messaging protocols to communicate the security-relevant information, such as security tokens and characteristics of security policy. The specification leaves room for custom authorization models to be tied into the architecture at the appropriate (i.e. WS-Policy) level. One proposal that attempts to supplement WS-Policy is the Web Service Policy Language (WSPL), which is an XACML profile for Web services and is used to publish the preferences and security requirements of a Web service using XACML. Because it uses XACML for access control policy, WSPL does not support roles and sessions-two features essential for scalable security in a dynamic Web services environment. In this paper, we present a role-based, session-aware access control model for composing Web services access control policy; 2 our XML-based framework allows easy integration into the existing XML-based architectures for Web services security, while providing an effective authorization mechanism suitable for Web services environment.
There has been an effort in the research community to highlight the challenges in Webbased access control within the XML framework, including both the initial DTD-based solutions [2, 7, 10, 18] , and the more recent schema-based approaches [4, 20] . In [4] , we have presented X-RBAC, an XML-based RBAC policy specification framework for enforcing access control in dynamic XML-based Web services. X-RBAC was designed to readily integrate within the XML framework, and emphasized simple, yet effective, administration through the use of RBAC. We also maintained that X-RBAC includes a comprehensive set of features that is comparable to the related access control schemes cited above, and is targeted for the Web services environment. Although X-RBAC and related schemes provide viable solutions, there remain issues that impede the development of effective access control models for Web services environment. Amongst them are the lack of context-aware models for access control, and reliance on identity or capability-based access control schemes. We next elaborate upon these issues, and propose an extended and trust-enhanced version of our X-RBAC model in an attempt to address them.
Trust-enhanced X-GTRBAC model
This section begins with an introduction to the X-GTRBAC model. It then describes the mechanism to configure X-GTRBAC to provide context-aware trust-based access control in Web services.
X-GTRBAC-An introduction
The X-GTRBAC framework is based on Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (GTRBAC) model [12] . X-GTRBAC augments GTRBAC with XML to allow for supporting the policy enforcement in an heterogeneous, distributed environment. GTRBAC extends the widely accepted Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model proposed in the NIST RBAC standard [9] . RBAC uses the concept of roles to embody a collection of permissions within an organizational setup. Permissions are associated with roles through a permission-to-role assignment, and the users are granted access to resources through a user-to-role assignment [16] . GTRBAC uses the core RBAC model as per the NIST standard, together with support for separation of duty and role hierarchies. It provides a generalized mechanism to express a diverse set of fine-grained temporal constraints on user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments in order to meet the dynamic access control requirements of an enterprise. In order to discuss the salient features of the X-GTRBAC specification language, we provide the formal definitions of the component models of our framework, namely RBAC and GTRBAC. [9] The RBAC model consists of the following components:
RBAC Model
• Sets Users, Roles, Permissions and Sessions representing the set of users, roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively; • UA: Users × Roles, the user assignment relation, that assigns users to roles;
• assigned users(r: Roles) → 2
Users , the mapping of role r onto a set of users. Formally: assigned users(r) = {u ∈ Users | (u, r ) ∈ UA} • PA: Roles × Permissions, the permission assignment relation, that assigns permissions to roles; • assigned permissions(r: Roles)→ 2
Permissions , the mapping of role r onto a set of permissions. Formally: assigned permissions(r) = { p ∈ Permissions | ( p, r ) ∈ PA} • user: Sessions → Users, which maps each session to a single user;
Roles that maps each session to a set of roles; • RH ⊆ Roles × Roles, a partially ordered role hierarchy (written ≥).
Session s i has the permission of all roles r junior to roles activated in the session, i.e. [12] The GTRBAC model incorporates a set of language constructs for the specification of various temporal constraints on roles, including constraints on their activations as well as on their enabling times, user-to-role assignments, and permission-torole assignments. In particular, GTRBAC makes a clear distinction between role enabling and role activation. An enabled role indicates that a user can activate it, whereas an activated role indicates that at least one subject has activated a role in a session. The notion of separate activation conditions is particularly helpful in large enterprises, with several hundred users belonging to the same role, to selectively manage role activations at the individual user level.
The temporal constraints in GTRBAC allow the specification of the following constraints and events:
1. Temporal constraints on role enabling/disabling: These constraints allow one to specify the time intervals during which a role is enabled. When a role is enabled, the permissions assigned to it can be acquired by a user by simply activating the role. It is also possible to specify a role duration. When such a duration is specified, the enabling/disabling event for a role is initiated by a constraint-enabling expression that may be separately specified at run-time by an administrator or by a trigger (See 6).
Temporal constraints on user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments:
These are constructs to express either a specific interval or a duration in which a user or a permission is assigned to a role. 3. Activation constraints: These allow one to specify how a user should be restricted in activating a role. These include, for example, specifying the total duration for which a user is allowed to activate a role, or the number of users that can be allowed to activate a particular role.
Run-time events:
A set of run-time events allows an administrator to dynamically initiate GTRBAC events, or enable duration or activation constraints. Another set of run-time events allow users to make activation requests to the system. 5. Constraint enabling expressions: GTRBAC includes events that enable or disable duration constraints and role activation constraints. 6. Triggers: Triggers allow one to express dependency among GTRBAC events as well as capture the past events and specify future events based on them.
A periodic expression is written as (I, P), where I is an interval and P is an infinite set of intervals. (I, P) represents the subset of all intervals in P that are contained in I . D is used to express the duration specified for a duration constraint. The temporal constraint types and expressions in GTRBAC are summarized in Table 1 . User-to-role
Users' activation request (s: (de)activate r for u after t)) requests Administrator's (s: (de)activate r for u after t)) run-time request (assign U /de-assign U r to u after t) (enable/disable r after t) (assign P /de-assign P p to r after t) (enable/disable c after t) X-GTRBAC allows the specification of all the elements of the GTRBAC model. These specifications are captured through a context-free grammar called X-Grammar, which follows the same notion of terminals and non-terminals as in BNF, but supports the tagging notation of XML that also allows expressing attributes within element tags. The detailed specification of these elements of X-GTRBAC framework can be found in [3] . Table 2 enlists the salient features of the model.
We now describe the mechanism to configure X-GTRBAC to provide context-aware trustbased access control in Web services. Toward that end, we need to outline a set of formal specifications to capture contextual information, and illustrate how it can be incorporated within the access control model. In addition, we would need to provide an interface to the system to accept TM credentials instead of its usual user credentials as the basis of privilege assignments.
Context-aware access control
This section defines the set of specifications needed to configure X-GTRBAC for contextaware access control in Web services environment. We base our set of specifications on a tuple language that can be readily mapped onto our existing XML-based framework. In the following, we provide the formal definition of context, and then use that to provide the definition for a service access request. In order to formalize the context, we introduce a type system to allow specifying domains of legal values for various context parameters. Our formal model relies on the components we define below:
Parameter Name Set: A set PN to denote the possible names of context parameters Parameter Type Set: A set PT to denote the possible types of context parameters Context Parameter: A context parameter is represented by a data structure p, having the following fields: name ∈ PN, type ∈ PT, and a function getValue().
A service is an abstraction of the operations provided by the system on its resources.
Formally, a service is a subset of the operation set RO, and is designated by the service name srv that is defined according to the wsdl:service element of the WebServices Description Language (WSDL) document Services Set:
The composition of service access policy requires a careful analysis as services may be composed at different granularities of operations each having a different access protection requirement. The granularity of operation is related to the fine-grained access control requirement in Web services. For example, consider a document dissemination Web service, supporting a specific getDocument() service. In practice, the getDocument() service might need to comprise of two distinct operations, read and save. The former only allows one to be able to read the document online, while the latter provides the option to save it locally. The service access policy may require that certain users are restricted to perform only a read and not the save operation. Without a fine granularity of operations, such restriction may not be imposed; either a user accesses all of the service or none at all. Therefore, a two-level granularity of operations needs to be supported by this service, so that a fine-grained access control can be exercised on the individual operations. We treat the srv element at an abstract level for the definitions in this sub-section, but discuss the service access policy composition in detail in next sub-section.
Definition 1 (Context set).
A context set C consists of n context parameters { p 1 , . . .., p n }, n ≥ 0, s.t. for any p i , p j , with i = j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, we have that p i .name = p j .name (i.e. the parameter names must be distinct).
We mention here that PN and PT constitute a set of pre-specified parameter names and types determined by the SSO. For example, the set PN may be defined as: PN = {timeofday, location, duration, systemload}, with the corresponding set PT defined as: PT = {Time, String, Long, Integer}. The p.getValue() function is used to dynamically compute the value of the parameter, and its implementation is system-dependent. For built-in system parameters, such as timeofday, it might just serve as a wrapper around system functions such as getCurrentTime(). The dynamic mechanism to compute parameter values especially helps in the case of mobile users accessing Web-based services, because in such environments the parameter values are constantly changing and may need to be re-evaluated at certain intervals. Additionally, for dynamic access constraints, such as duration, getValue() would be called periodically to ensure that the constraint is always satisfied. We also note from the preceding definition that the context may be an empty set.
Definition 2 (Service access request).
A service access request is defined as a triple < role, srv, contextset> where role ∈ RR, srv ∈ SRVS, and contextset is defined according to Definition 1 and comprises of the context parameters captured dynamically at the time of the access request.
Based on the service access request, the system determines the applicable access policy for the requested service. This policy will be based on a set of constraints on the role and service name, and evaluated in conjunction with the available contextual information to enforce fine grained access control, such as the one motivated in getDocument() service above. An access constraint in our framework is a collection of access conditions. In order to formulate an access condition, we refer to the notion of parameterized roles of [3] . Parameterized roles are roles supplemented with role attributes. The attributes set A of a role contains a collection of contextual attributes (such as time, location or system load) that may be used to define context-based conditions on roles. The values of these attributes are specified by the SSO, and these values are compared with the values of the supplied context parameters in order to evaluate an access request. The set of contextual attributes of a role is hence a subset of the set C of context parameters, and follows the same type system. We formally define the access policy below. We assume the existence of a function getAttributesSet(role), which returns the set A for a given role.
Definition 3 (Access policy). Let r ∈ RR be a role, srv ∈ SRVS be a service name denoting a service. The access policy AP for a (r , srv) pair is a set of clauses, where each clause is a Boolean combination of expressions. An expression is of the form <attr val> where attr is a role attribute s.t. attr ∈ getAttributesSet ( r ) , val is the value of the parameter as specified by the SSO in order for role r to access the service srv, and is any relational comparison operator.
This definition shall be implemented in our XML-based language specification in the next sub-section. It may be mentioned that we have intentionally kept our model generic enough, as it is unlikely for any one model to capture all types of contextual information and associated conditions that might arise in practice. But for most practical purposes, the sets PN, PT and role attributes may be extended according to the system requirements in order to define access conditions based on appropriate context parameters.
We now give the following set of algorithms to evaluate a service access request.
The ComputeAccess algorithm works as follows. In Step 1, the clauses corresponding to the (role,srv) pair are retrieved from the AP into a dynamic array CL.
Step 2 retrieves the attributes of the role into a dynamic array A. In Step 3, the algorithm loops over the array CL and calls the routine getDecision() for each of the clauses. Each clause has potentially multiple expressions, and so each expression is evaluated using the evaluateExpr() routine. For each expression, this routine retrieves the attribute from the attribute array A and then calls the routine checkCondition() to evaluate the conditions corresponding to this role attribute. This routine loops over the set C of supplied context parameters and finds the matching context parameter for this role attribute by calling the match() routine, which internally compares the name and type of the two entities. Since the set A is a subset of set C, this search always results in a match. When a match is found, it compares their values according to the operator specified in the AP. If the condition is satisfied, a value of true is returned to getDecision.
After the result for all access conditions within the clause has been computed, the getDecision routine then computes the overall result for the clause and returns it to ComputeAccess. If any of the clauses evaluates to false, a NO is returned as the output of the ComputeAccess algorithm, because the overall access decision is a conjunction of all individual clauses. Otherwise, after the loop terminates successfully over all the clauses, a YES is returned. Other decisions such as PENDING or N/A may also be returned by incorporating system-specific logic into the algorithm.
As an illustration, consider the example of a recently launched initiative of a German insurance company [1] . The company leverages Web services technology to introduce online visitors to its services, and allows them to purchase insurance coverage through an entirely digital process. The evaluation of an online coverage request requires several kinds of personal information to be made available, and the same needs to persist in the company's database for a subsequent evaluation of an insurance claim. At that point, however, the access to the customer's resources should only be granted after establishing the fact that the requestor indeed is "the" genuine customer. For instance, assume that the following service access request is submitted for evaluation to the system: <role = customer, servicename = "review claim", contextset = {p 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ,p 4 )>.
This request says that a user belonging to the customer role has requested to review an online insurance claim through the Web-based reviewclaim service offered by the company. The context recorded at the time of access request is provided to the system as part of the request. For the context set in this example, assume the following: p 1 .name = time, p 1 .getValue() = 12PM,p 2 .name = location, p 2 .getValue() = "WashDC", p 3 . name = duration, p 3 .getValue() = 0, p 4 .name = sys temload, p 3 .getValue() = "low". Note that duration is initialized to 0 because the access has not yet started. Now, assume that the following AP is applicable to the given (role, srv) pair: {CL1 , CL2, CL3 , CL4} s.t.
CL1: time > 9AM AND time < 5PM
CL2: location = "WashDC" OR location = "NewYork" CL3: systemload != "high" CL4: duration ≤ 600s
Based on this information, the system would return an authorization decision for this service access request. The available contextual information indicates that the access conditions are satisfied. In addition, due to the duration constraint specified for the requested service and enforced by the dynamic temporal constraint mechanism of GTRBAC, the access duration of the user in an active session is monitored, 4 and any violation thereof is detected on a per-user basis by the GTRBAC Processor (see Table 4 ). The mechanism to deal with the violation is system-specific, but GTRBAC allows a trigger mechanism to take immediate actions in such situations (such as de-activating the role for the given user). The next sub-section discusses the composition of this policy using our X-GTRBAC specification language.
Service access policy
This section outlines a mechanism for composing service access policies at varying levels of granularity of operations with different access protection requirements. A key consideration in composing Web service access policies is to enforce adequate access controls while simultaneously retaining reasonable flexibility in service construction. Current models for Web-based access control [2, 4, 7, 10, 18, 20] do not offer such flexibility as they are typically designed for targeting individual resources whereas services provide another level of abstraction on top of those resources. A mechanism is needed that allows arbitrary construction of services from multiple operations where access protection rules on the service vary depending on the included operations, and such configuration should be easy to do. Our X-GTRBAC framework is particularly well-suited for this task due to its modular design. The model has emphasized separation of language schemas to provide distinct specification of definitions of RBAC elements, user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments and hierarchical and separation of duty constraints. This modular approach makes it easy to extend one component of the model independently of the other, and hence allows us to introduce a service abstraction into the model.
The idea for composing service policies is as follows. In the original RBAC model, the permissions comprise of objects and operations. The service is an abstraction of operations on a set of corresponding objects, and hence can be represented as a collection of permissions in our framework. We therefore interpose a service assignment into the permission-to-role assignment mechanism, whereby the roles are assigned permissions indirectly through a service assignment. This means that the permission-to-role assignment sheet (XPRAS) is now replaced by the service-to-role assignment sheet (XSRAS). The permissions are associated with a service through an XML Service Definition (XSD) where a service is defined as in Section 3.2. The service access policy is hence composed using the XSRAS based on the appropriate service definitions. This will be illustrated shortly with an example.
We reemphasize here that above mechanism allows for arbitrary service construction from multiple operations and supports access protection requirements of the service depending on the included operations. This flexibility is achieved through the use of modular schema definitions of the permission elements. In our framework, a permission assignment (to be included in a service) is modeled such that it has an optional set of associated access constraints. When a service is constructed using a set of permissions, the permissions provide an interface to access the operations provided by the service. These operations hence can only be accessed if the access constraints of the corresponding permission assignment are met. The framework allows for specification of access rules through logical expressions comprising of Boolean predicates. In figure 1 , we present the XSD and the XSRAS for the reviewclaim service of Section 3.2. Figure 1 (b) defines the reviewclaim service that includes the permissions read and save defined in figure 1(a) . The service is then assigned to the Customer role according to the service policy in figure 1(c) . With respect to Definition 3, the Customer role and the reviewclaim service comprise the <r , srv> pair. The service policy comprises of a set of logical expressions that correspond to the <attr val> clauses in Definition 3. The logical expressions are grouped into a constraint. In figure 1c , the assignment constraint on the service assignment contains a logical expression that defines a context predicate indicating that the service could only be invoked from locations WashDC or NewYork, and when the system load is not high. X-GTRBAC also allows a constraint expression to be referenced inside another constraint which is especially useful with temporal constraints. Figure 1(c) indicates two such constraints: (i) an interval constraint expressed using id reference to an interval expression that restricts the validity interval to between 9 AM and 5 PM, and (ii) a duration constraint expressed using the id reference to a duration expression that restricts the duration of each claim review session to 600 seconds.
We would like to make a note here about the object and operation components of a permission, such as the one shown in figure 1a . When a permission is created to be included in a service definition, the "object type" is a port and "object id" is the port number, since Web services are typically accessed through a binding on a specific port. The contents of the "operation" tag map to the system level implementation of the operation on the target system. Although the tag can be used to directly name an operation, object oriented designers can use the tag to associate it with a corresponding method invocation that allows the required operation to be performed. This mechanism allows one to change the implementation of the operation without modifying the authorization rules, since the access rules would not be tied directly to a physical operation name. Hence, the specification language provided here can be configured to support encapsulation. However, we do not explicitly include support for it, and leave it as an implementation issue.
Trust model
In this section, we introduce a trust model for X-GTRBAC. The motivation for trust in access control has been briefly discussed in the introduction. In essence, trust is used to provide two primary features:
They are discussed in the following sub-sections.
Trust-based authentication.
This sub-section briefly describes a mechanism to incorporate trust domains in X-GTRBAC to enable effective access control in a distributed environment, where user identities are not known a-priori. Since X-GTRBAC makes the access decisions based on the eligible roles for known users, we can use Trust Management (TM) credentials discussed in Section 1 to assign roles to users. While it is sometimes viewed as appropriate in TM to adopt a direct authorization model, i.e. to combine authentication and access control into one authorization step [6] , we would like to motivate here that the indirection through roles helps scalability and flexibility in the case of large scale open systems, especially Web services. Hence, a significant advantage that accompanies the rolebased approach adopted in our framework is that of simplified authorization administration [16] . Earlier approaches that merged features from TM and RBAC are reported in [11, 13] . However, our primary goals are different from theirs. The approach in [13] is primarily a TM credential exchange and distribution mechanism to assist authorizations in a distributed environment; it does not support an elaborate access control scheme beyond the basic permission-to-role assignment mechanism in RBAC. We focus on providing a contextaware access control model for the Web services environment, and rely on TM credentials for determining the trust level (i.e. role) associated with a user. The approach in [11] has similar objectives as ours, but does not support context-aware access control desirable for dynamic Web services environment. Secondly, the work in [11] does not seem to suggest any support for advanced forms of RBAC beyond the core model. The TM approach to establish role memberships of users requires the X-GTRBAC model to be adapted to accept TM credentials. We touch upon the mechanisms needed to do this in Section 4, but leave an elaborate treatment of the same for some future work, as it is not the focus of our current paper. It may be noted here that the trust-based approach to verifying user credentials effectively adds authentication support to our existing authorization model.
Dynamic trust adjustment.
As mentioned in the introduction, the trust level initially established for a user can be subsequently adjusted based on the user's access context. In this sub-section, we describe the motivations and mechanisms for doing so.
In dynamic Web services environment, the notion of static authorizations does not always adequately address the security requirements. The trust level in the user may need to be enhanced or reduced and their authorizations appropriately adapted according to the situation. In certain sensitive applications, such as online trading or credit approval processing, it is reasonable to assume that the usage profile of the customer is an indicator of their trustworthiness, and hence can be taken into account when deciding future authorizations. Another example is of Web-based collaborative applications, such as intraenterprise production schedule, or workflow management system, wherein the access to information is allowed on a need-to-acquire basis. For example, the sensitive resources of an enterprise may only be exposed during the relevant production stage and not throughout the product lifecycle. Or, resources for a particular activity in a workflow may only be made available when the pre-requisite tasks have been completed. In all such situations, the access rights of the individuals need to be dynamically adjusted in order to either allow access to otherwise restricted resources, or disallow access to resources currently authorized.
Since there is an increasing trend in enterprises to provide the above mentioned facilities as Web-based services, the access control requirements for such services need to be adequately and timely analyzed and addressed. Our prior work on X-GTRBAC has addressed the dynamic authorizations within a Computer Integrated Enterprise [3] and dynamic Web services environments [4] . However, those do not include the notion of dynamic trust adjustment, i.e., even though the authorization enforcement is dynamic, the authorization assignment is done based on a statically assigned trust level which cannot be updated should the need arise to do so. Like we motivated earlier, adjustment of trust would allow authorizations to be adapted based on changing access context. This work aims to investigate a dynamic trust adjustment model to assist with this task. This sub-section gives a preliminary sketch of the concept.
Our proposed trust adjustment model is a comprehensive one involving both technical and human dimensions. The technical side of the model takes into account the assertions about the individual from the attribute authorities. Such assertions can be provided through the use of TM credentials, the incorporation of which in our X-GTRBAC system has been discussed in the earlier sub-section. The attribute assertions about a person may need to be dynamically generated or updated, thus requiring trust level to be adjusted. These variations mirror the actual changes to an individuals profile as they enter various phases of a business transaction. The second and more intricate dimension in our trust adjustment model is that involving human behavior and related context. We call this information as the access context. The access context of the user consists of the environmental state (such as time, location) and the access profile of the user (akin to an activity log). The access profile of a user can be maintained by logging the contextual information associated with the invocation and acceptance of a service access request as defined in Section 3.2. The available environmental state at the time of access can then be included with this information to comprise the access context, which is then used for trust adjustment.
The idea of trust adjustment using access context is then as follows. The access profile of a user is mapped to a carefully developed statistical model indicating the correlation with various contextual parameters. This modeling technique is then used to do inductive inference on the set of available data (i.e. access pattern), detect any significant accumulation of positive or negative trends, and make upward or downward adjustment if needed to the trust level of the user so as to adapt the access pattern to the model. The model development is an ambitious on-going task. We expect our statistical model to yield realistic outcomes to usual access profiles under reasonably well-correlated contextual conditions. We provide an example in Section 4 illustrating this concept within the scope of our current system architecture. Detailed results shall be published in some future work.
The initiation of this effort is not without due motivation since there is a lack of existing mechanisms that provide such capability. Although there have been earlier approaches in using trust in access control, none has talked explicitly about a trust adjustment model, or proposed a formal model for it. The work presented in [8] is a risk analysis technique for establishing trust in a distributed environment. However it effectively issues a one-time trust decision and does not use access profile of the user for subsequent trust adjustment Also, with regards to our notion of access context, it is different from the notion of "trust context" proposed in [8] . Although the idea there is also to use trust in access control, they use a different criteria for trust establishment, primarily involving "evidence" based on "observations" and "recommendations" related to the trust contexts. The trust contexts in [8] are the various "dimensions" of the trustworthiness of a user, such as honesty, carefulness, etc., which we believe are hard to measure in practice. Additionally, a concept such as recommendation introduces the argument of cascaded trust in the sources of recommendation, unless they can be standardized in ways similar to delegation in trust management. In our opinion, the most effective indicator in establishing dynamic trust is the user's demonstrated behavior evidenced through the access profile. In addition, we need the environmental state at the time of current access to incorporate dynamic context in the access decision. We therefore use this combined access context as the basis of our trust adjustment model. Figure 2 shows the design of the trust adjustment module integrated with our X-GTRBAC system. The implementation strategy is discussed in the next section.
System architecture
This section provides an expanded system architecture which illustrates the interplay between the features of context-awareness and trust adjustment discussed in the paper. It also provides general design guidelines for implementing the trust-based context-aware access control model in real Web services environments.
The system architecture is depicted in figure 3 . The architecture adds several modules with respect to the one in figure 2 to expand on the concepts and provide an implementation strategy. The Context Module in figure 3 to the Heterogeneity Analyzer which consults the available Domain Ontologies to resolve any heterogeneity issues resulting from differing interpretation of context across different domains. The analyzed context information is then passed on to the Trust Adjustment Module. It consists of a Consistency Analyzer which evaluates the access context of the given request. As mentioned earlier, the access context comprises of the context information received from the Context Module and the access history available from the Access Log.
The Consistency analyzer will employ statistical methods to compare the current access context with subsequent ones, and make a recommendation to the Dynamic Trust Adjustment module if any significant (positive or negative) trend is observed as discussed in Section 3.4.2. The output of this module is then sent to the GTRBAC Processor which updates the system data structures in accordance with it, and makes the decision on the access request. The access decision is logged in the Access Log for subsequent analysis. In practice, the access log may be maintained as a cache, so that the consistency analysis may be carried out offline. This is an optimization that would avoid incurring the cost of performing a real-time analysis. The resource accesses may be prioritized so that only the more sensitive ones are analyzed in real-time, and the rest can be handled offline. This would make the mechanism more feasible and affordable to implement in real systems.
In the next sub-section, we give an example of the use of access context and consistency analysis to guide the trust adjustment process.
Illustrative example
We now provide an example that illustrates the concepts outlined above. Table 3 provides an instance of access context gathered for the reviewclaim service of Section 3.2. For the purposes of this example, we use decision tree [14] as the statistical model for consistency analysis on the available access context. The fine-grained access control specification in X-GTRBAC allows a rich enough training data for the decision tree algorithm. It can therefore be applied to obtain a reasonable correlation between the access context and the access decision. In other words, we can relate the outcome to the set of credentials needed to reach that outcome, and thereby identify the subjects who hold those credentials. Consequently, the trust level associated with those users can be adjusted based on the accumulated (positive or negative) trend. So for instance, user1 and user2 are assigned to the role of customer (subject to the evaluation of their credentials). Assume that a "significant" accumulation for this small data set means that a trend is repeated at least twice. Then, the access context above lends itself to a very simple decision tree analysis which splits the training data based on p 4 , i.e. the duration attribute, where the splitting criterion is checking the duration to be less than 600s. p 4 has the maximum entropy since all durations more than 600s resulted in a violation of the access privileges, and were logged as aborted. These are indicated as shaded rows in Table 3 . (The abort in third row resulted due to network load and was not treated as a violation.) Note that the duration constraint here cannot be enforced statically and the likelihood of a duration constraint being violated cannot be determined without the prior access context. Using X-GTRBAC and the access context, however, we can not only enforce the duration constraint but also observe an accumulation of a significant negative trend associated with accesses of reviewclaim service by the customer role. Therefore, the subjects assigned to that role, user1 and user2, will be the likely target of a (downward) trust adjustment. Fortunately, in the sample data set, we can additionally use the user column as the next determinant, which indicates that user1 is more likely to cause a violation of access privileges than user2. Therefore, the trust level of only user1 will be reduced. This example, though simple, clearly demonstrates the use of access context and consistency analysis toward providing context-awareness and trust adjustment in access control.
Prototype development
This sub-section discusses the current features of our implementation prototype, first reported in [4] . The major components of X-GTRBAC system architecture are summarized in Table 4 . The existing prototype incorporates the temporal constraint enforcement mechanism as per the GTRBAC model. The generalization of the contextual information to Performs consistency analysis on the generated access context; performs the task of dynamic trust adjustment include parameters other than time as described in the paper is being incorporated into the system. Essentially, non-temporal conditions are captured based on constraint expressions using context predicates and functions. Work is in progress on the Context Module which interfaces with the GTRBAC Processor as shown in figure 3 . The idea is to enable GTRBAC processor to handle dynamic access conditions which require runtime context evaluation and inference. This latter task will be performed by the Context Module through a set of function invocations, such as getSystemLoad, getCurrentLocation, etc, and a set of context definitions to aid in context inference. It is being planned to define a library of standard function routines which, once registered with the system, can be invoked to obtain context information. The trust model for our framework is in initial stages of development. We plan to include support for both trust-based authentication and dynamic trust adjustment. To achieve the former, we are working toward a set of specifications that would allow us to substitute the existing credential evaluation mechanism with that involving TM credentials. Because of the modular design of X-GTRBAC, this task can be accomplished with only slight modifications in the overall architecture. The components affected would be (i) the XML Policy Base, since it would now need to store a different XCredTypeDef sheet (See Table 2 ) based on TM credentials, and (ii) the XML Processor, since it would now employ a different evaluation logic for processing credential declarations. Our set of specifications would be XML-based, and hence can be expected to integrate well with the existing framework. For the dynamic trust adjustment model, we shall implement the design indicated in figure 3 by interfacing the Trust Adjustment Module with the GTRBAC Processor. We envisage the use of GTRBAC trigger mechanism in enabling dynamic trust adjustment. A trigger can be invoked by the trust-adjustment module when the latter senses a change in the access context of the user. The trigger dynamically updates the trust level for the corresponding user which is checked by the access control module when processing subsequent authorizations. The formal specifications for trust adjustment and policy verification shall be developed as part of this model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined a mechanism to develop a trust-based, context-aware access control model for Web services based on the X-GTRBAC framework. X-GTRBAC is a temporal extension of the earlier X-RBAC model for access control in Web services. The mechanism presented in the paper extends X-GTRBAC to support context-aware access control based on both temporal and non-temporal contextual conditions. We have also provided specifications for composing service access policy in X-GTRBAC for Web services environment. In addition, we introduce a trust model for our framework. One, we outline a mechanism to incorporate trust domains into X-GTRABC by the use of TM credentials for unknown users. Such an approach effectively adds authentication support to our system. Secondly, we also propose a trust adjustment model that allows dynamic authorization adjustment in situations that so demand. We have discussed the configuration of X-GTRBAC for its application in Web services environment, and also proposed extensions to our current implementation architecture for the purposes outlined in this paper. We intend to report the detailed results of our on-going implementation efforts in future works.
There are other aspects of our work that require further research. We plan to explore the interplay of contextual conditions in the presence of separation of duty constraints and role hierarchies. In these situations, it is critical to ensure that the access to services based on inherited permissions do not violate any separation of duty constraints. Also of interest would be to assess the impact of trust adjustment on Web service contracts, and how the adjustment in service access levels would be reflected back into the service level agreements (SLAs). Another future direction of research would be to investigate the suitability of the proposed administration model for X-GTRBAC [5] to Web services. With regards to the service access policy, an interesting aspect to look into is that related to registering and attaching access policies with Web services. This requires investigating integration strategies between our framework and the existing Web services standards, such as UDDI and WSDL. Overall, we expect to see our framework evolve with time, as Web services standards are continually being enhanced, and would likely incorporate additional security mechanisms such as secure messaging and transaction support into our system. Along related lines, it would be desirable to design a framework to evaluate security properties of a Web service based on the existing and emerging Web services specifications.
